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SoMMER v. METAL TRADES CouNCIL

[L. A. No. 21757.

In Bank.

[ 40 C.2d

Mar. 10, 1953.]

HERMAN C. SOMMER, Respondent, v. ME'l'AL TRADES
COUNCIL OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Police Power.-The state has power to set the limits
of permissible contest available to industrial combatants, so
long as constitutional guaranties are observed.
[2] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-The factors of
protection and condemnation under the National Labor Relations Act largely determine whether an area of industrial
dispute is one closed to state control; if the subject matter
of a local statute is otherwise one within the area of permissible exercise of state power in the maintenance of industrial peace, and state policy is consistent with federal
policy, the state does not necessarily encroach on the area
of control vested in the National Labor Relations Board.
[3] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-If a union's
concerted activity is not protected under the National Labor
Relations Act, it is not immunized from state control, and
such activity is not protected under the federal act if another union is certified by the national board as the collective
bargaining representative of plaintiff's employees.
[4] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-In absence of
national board's certification of a union as the collective bargaining representative of plaintiff's employees, there is no
immunity under state law if the employees' local union constitutes a collective bargaining representative within the
meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, § 1115
et seq.)
[5] !d.-Police Power-State or Federal ControL-Where certification of a union other than defendant union is not shown, a
case of condemnation of union activity under the National
Labor Relations Act is not presented.
[6] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-The state policy of outlawing jurisdictional coercive activity in the maintenance of peaceful
industrial relations justifies injunctive as well as legal relief.
[7] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Provisions of amended National Labor
Relations Act, § 303 (b), confining the action which may be
brought in state courts for unfair labor practices of a union
[1] See 5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 4 et seq.;

Am.Jur., Labor, § 409 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] Labor, §1; [6,7,10] Labor, §25;
[8] Labor, § 23; [9] Labor, § 21.
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to that for recovery of damages to business or property, affect
state jurisdiction in matters covered by that act but do not
preclude local injunctive relief in an area open to state control.
[8] Id.-Picketing.-In view of the constitutional right of states
to proscribe picketing in the furtherance of unlawful objectives, labor unions do not have the right to publicize a
labor dispute by means of placards and picketing if the
objective is shown to be in violation of the Jurisdictional
Strike Act.
[9] !d.-Jurisdictional Strike Act.-A local unaffiliated organization of nonunion employees, if qualified and undominated by
the employer, may constitute a labor organization for collective bargaining purposes within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, § 1117.)
[10] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Where the factual elements which
would support an injunction to restrain picketing arising out
of a dispute between defendant labor unions and a local unit
organized by plaintiff's employees cannot be finally resolved
until a trial on the merits, jurisdiction to order a preliminary
injunction to maintain the status quo pending such trial is
established on a prima facie showing of qualification and
voluntary character of the employees' organization, and such
injunctive order will not be disturbed in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion.
'-""'"'-de~---""''"'"'"'~'""""''-'··'

H.

-'-<ib• :.~,,~,

~'-~" ---_;;,,./~!:

-the Superior CourC~f-L~s
Angeles County granting a preliminary injunction. W. Turney Fox, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Garrett, John C. Stevenson, Todd & Todd and Clarence E. Todd for Appellants.
Charles P. Seully and Tobriner & Lazarus as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellants.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, "William French Smith, James
R. Hutter and C. Robert Simpson, Jr., for Respondent.
Roth & Bahrs as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the defendants from an
order granting a preliminary injunction.
The controversy involves concerted union activities which
bring into question the application of the Jurisdictional
Strike Act of this state ( § 1115 et seq., Labor Code added
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by Stats. 1947, p. 2592). The constitutional validity of
that statute has been determined in Seven Up Bottling Co.
v. Orocer-y D1·ivers Union, L. A. No. 21347 (ante, p. 368
I ~5-t P .2d 544]). rrhe question is whether the state court
had jurisdiction to order the preliminary injunction and, if
it had jurisdiction whether it properly exercised its discretion in directing that it should issue.
For 31 years the plaintiff has. manufactured, distributed
and installed auto service stations and equipment. He employs 50 persons. The defendant unions are affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor. The individual defendants are members and officers of the unions.
Prior to July, 1949, the plaintiff's employees were unorganized. In that month the defendants demanded of the
plaintiff that he recognize the unions as the exclusive collective bargaining representatives of the employees, and that
only members of the unions be employed by him. In September the employees held meetings to organize The Workers
Association of Manufacturers and Builders of Auto Service
Union Local No. 1, without A. F. of L. or other union affiliation, and demanded that the employer recognize it as their
exclusive bargaining representative. The plaintiff refused to
recognize either Local No. 1 or the unions as the employees'
collective bargaining agent. Peaceful picketing and secondary
boycott activities, including the representation that the plaintiff was unfair to organized labor, were commenced by the defendants on September 15, 1949.
Also in September the employees' Local filed a petition
with the National Labor Relations Board for certification
as the representative for collective bargaining purposes. The
unions intervened and contested for recognition. On February 24, 1950, the National Board found that the plaintiff
was engaged in commerce within the meaning of the federal
labor relations law and ordered an election. The plaintiff
alleges that an election was conducted by the Local; that
25 employees voted for the Local, seven of which votes were
challenged by the defendants, and that five employees voted
for the unions. It does not appear whether the election was
pursuant to the board's direction or whether certification of
a collective bargaining representative followed.
rrhe defendants continued their concerted activities and
the plaintiff commenced this action for injunctive relief and
damages in March, 1950. A hearing on the return to an
order to show cause was had on the verified complaint and
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numerous affidavits. The court granted the preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from conducting the picketing and secondary boycott activities and from representing to others that the plaintiff is unfair to organized labor.
The plaintiff's employees are not on strike. The dispute
is between the two groups concerning union organization of
the plaintiff's employees, collective bargaining representation and consequent work assignment. It is not questioned
that the union picketing and secondary boycott activities
substantially interfered with the conduct of the plaintiff's
business.
The plaintiff contends that the concerted union activity
presents a case of a jurisdictional strike which is in violation of and enjoinable pursuant to the Jurisdictional Strike
Act of which the state court has jurisdiction. The defendants contend that their activity is not in violation of the
act and in any event is governable solely pursuant to the
federal law.
Section 1115 of the Labor Code declares a jurisdictional
strike to be against the public policy of the state and unlawful. Section 1116 provides the remedies by injunction and
damages. ''Labor organization'' is defined as any organiza··
tion or any agency or employee representation committee or
any local unit thereof in which employees participate which
exists for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning
grievances and labor disputes and is not found to be financed,
interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer
( § 1117). Section 1118 defines "jurisdictional strike" as a
''concerted refusal to perform work for an employer or any
other concerted interference with an employer's operation
or business, arising out of a controversy between two or more
labor organizations as to which of them has or should have
the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer
on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out
of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as
to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to
have its members perform work for an employer." Section
1119 preserves, subject to the foregoing restrictions, the right
of collective bargaining and the right of any individual voluntarily to become or remain a member of a labor organization or personally to request any other individual to join
a labor organization.
A policy prohibiting concerted jurisdictional activity is
also contained in the federal law. Section 8 (b) ( 4) of the
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amended Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act, July
5, 1935, 49 Stats. 452, ch. 372, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158, as amended
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stats. 140)
specifies concerted jurisdictional activities which are declared
to be unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations, and section 303 (a) of the amended act declares the
conduct to be unlawful. (See discussion Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, 1950 Supplement, p. Ill
et seq., p. 121 et seq.) For present purposes it is sufficient
to note that section 8(b) (4) (C) declares it to be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to engage in concerted
activity (as here) for the purpose of forcing or requiring
the employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor
organization as the representative of his employees if another
labor organization has been certified as their representative
under the provisions of the act.
The preliminary injunction was ordered in May, 1950.
The trial court appears not to have been informed as to any
finality in the representation proceeding before the National
Labor Relations Board. For the purpose of this appeal it is
assumed that the plaintiff is engaged in interstate commerce
and that there is no certification of a collective bargaining
representative for his employees under the federal act. In
the representation proceeding the unions sought to introduce
evidence of employer domination of the Local, but the evidence was refused consideration because the issue was not
subject to litigation in that proceeding. Subsequently the
unions filed charges of employer coercion and domination of
the Local in violation of sections 8 (a) ( 1) and ( 2) of the
federal act. In December, 1949, the evidence of domination
was held to be insufficient to warrant investigation at that
time. On September 22d and December 5, 1949, the employer
filed with the National Board charges of union jurisdictional
activity in violation of section 8(b) (4) of the act. On December 28th the charges were dismissed for lack of evidence
of violation at that time. It does not appear that the charges
were renewed after a possible certification of the employees'
Local as their representative for collective bargaining purposes.
It may also be assumed that the evidence which was relevant
in the representation contest and to the several charges of
unfair labor practices before the National Board bears on
the issues here. But it does not follow that the state court
does not have jurisdiction of this controversy.
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Gerry of California v. St~perior Court (June, 1948), 32
Cal.2d 119 [ 194 P .2d 689], does not determine with finality
the matter of jurisdiction on this appeal. The Gerry case
involved interstate commerce but was not concerned with
union jurisdictional activity as defined in our statute. Secondary boycott activities were there employed by A.F. of L.
unions for the purpose of organizing the petitioner's nonunion employees. ln view of the fact that the court in In re
Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643 [184 P.2d 892], had held invalid the
hot cargo and secondary boycott act of 1941, the petitioner
agreed that there was no California statute which could furnish equitable redress. The petitioner contended that the
state had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor
Relations Board to enforce the provisions of the federal act.
'l'he decision rejecting the contention was a determination
that in the absence of a valid applicable local statute affording relief, facts which amount to unfair labor practices under
the federal act are cognizable exclusively in a proceeding before the National Board. This court in In re Dei:'iilva, ;};)
Cal.2d 76, 78 [199 P.2d 6], again recognized that the Gerry
case involved the question of the concurrent jurisdiction of
the state court to enforce the federal act. Thus the problem
now is not whether the state has concurrent jurisdiction with
the National Board to enforce the federal act. 'l'he question
is whether the state court has jurisdiction to enforce the
provisions of a state statute making the defined union jurisdictional activity unlawful and subject to restraint.
At the time of the decision in the Gerry case, Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board (April,
1947), 330 U.S. 767 [67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234], was the
latest holding of the Supreme Court that except where jurisdiction had been ceded by the National Board to a state
agency, state and federal action in matters covered by the
federal act could not coexist. The Supreme Court has since
recognized the validity of state action in those cases where
the conduct complained of is neither forbidden nor legalized
and approved under the federal act.
The Bethlehem Steel formula was followed in La Crosse
Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Ernp. Relations Board (Jan., 1949),
336 U.S. 18 [69 S.Ct. 379, 93 L.Ed. 463], where cession had
not been granted. The jurisdiction of the local board in a
certification procedure was denied because of inconsistencies
between the federal and the state acts. The court said at
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page 26: ''A. certification by a state board under a different
or eonflieting theory of representation may therefore be as
readily cli,;ruptive of the practice under the federal act as if
the orders of the two boards made a head-on collision. These
are the very real potentials of conflict which lead us to allow
supremacy to the federal scheme even though it has not y<"t
been applied in any formal way to this particular employer."
[1] The state power to set the limits of permissible cmJtest available to industrial combatants, so long as constitntioual guaranties are observed, is not open to question. (Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 [57 S.Ct. 857,
81 L.Ed. 1229] ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 [ 60
S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093].) International Union v. Wiscons1:n
Emp. Relat1'ons Board (Feb., 1949), 336 U.S. 245 [69 S.Ct.
516, 93 L.Ed. 651], again recognized the area of control open
to the state (see numerous cases cited at p. 257; cf. Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 [69 S.Ct. 684, 93
L.Ed. 834] ; see, also, Gerry of California v. Superior Court,
supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 125 and cases cited). There the local
board ordered the union to cease intermittent unannounced
work stoppages for unstated purposes and other concerted
activity except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner
for the purpose of exercising the protected right of going on
strike. The Supreme Court pointed out that the enjoined
activity was neither forbidden nor protected by the federal
act.
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board (Mar., 1949), 336 U.S. 301 [69 S.Ct. 584,93 L.Ed.
691], concerned a Vvisconsin law which provided for a
maintenance-of-membership clause in the labor contract when
a two-thirds employee vote favored the inclusion in a referendum conducted by the \Visconsin board. No referendum
had been conducted under the state or federal act, but in
January, 1947, an employee was discharged pursuant to such
a clause in the current labor contract. The state court sustained the jurisdiction of the local board in the issuance of a
cease and desist order to the employer including a direction
for reinstatement and back pay. With the less restrictive
conditions in the federal act the Supreme Court found no
conflict between it and the state act on the subject of union
seeurity maintenance. In affirming the state judgment, the
court reviewing the legislative history and debate and eoneluded that Congress did not intend to interfere with state
adion on the subject. Cession was deemed essential only
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where the state and federal laws were parallel. Where there
was no overlapping, cession was said to be unnecessary beeause the state's jurisdiction remains unimpaired. The court
also recognized the impact of the 1947 amendments to require
a modification of the Bethlehem Steel decision in cases where
the National Board had declined jurisdiction, in order to permit freedom of state action including pursuit of the more
restrictive state policies. The modification was held to apply
so long as Congress did not manifest an unambiguous intention to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the National Board,
and the state policy was not inconsistent with national policy.

Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board
(Feb., 1950), 338 U.S. 953 [70 S.Ct. 491, 94 L.Ed. 588], also
involved the maintenance of union membership. On December
6. 1946, the local board orderrd the reemployment of employee
Stokrs who on May 9, 1945, had been discharged for failnre
to maintain his union membership. The state court determined
that the local board had jurisdiction on the authority of the
Alg-oma Plywood decision. The Supreme Court reversed
witl10ut opinion citing Bethlehem Steel and La Crosse. Bnt
it <'annot be assumed that the Supreme Court intended to
overrule the Algoma Plywood declarations. It must on the
rontrary be assumed that the facts in Plankinton wonlcl diselose a federally protected union maintenance clause ·which
wonlo form the basis of the implied conclusion of absenee of
state jurisdiction.
International Union Etc. ~1. & A. I. W. v. O'Brien (May,
1950). 339 U.S. 454 r10 S.Ct. 781. 94 L.Ed. 978], involved a
strike vote provision of the Michigan labor mediation law.
It was held that since this was a protected and regulated right
in a field occupied by Congress it was closed to state regulation
11ncler a statute which confiieted with the exercise of federally
protected labor rights. The court recogni.:~;ed that in Internfltional Union v. Wiscons1:n Emp. Relat?:ons Board, .mvrll
(336 U.S. 245, 252), it had reaffirmed the principle that if
''Congress has protected the union conduct which the State
has forbidden . . . the state legislation mnst yield" (339
TTS. at p. 459).
[2] It is thus apparent that the factors of protection and
eondemnation under the federal act largely determine whether
the area is one closed to state control. The decisions indicate
that the presence of those factors are deemed to disclose an
intention on the part of Congress to place exclusive jurisdic-
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tion in the National Board. They also demonstrate that the
problem is not one which in every case is resolved solely by
looking to the provisions of the federal act; but that if the
subject matter of the local statute is otherwise one within
the area of permissible exercise of state power in the maintenance of industrial peace, and state policy is consistent with
federal policy, the state does not necessarily encroach upon
the area of control vested in the National Board. .And in
some cases it is seen that the presence or absence of the
factors of protection or condemnation under the federal act
may be resolved by the fact of whether the National Board
has or has not assumed jurisdiction.
The extent to which the organizational coercive measures
are lawful is not involved at this time. It is sufficient to note
that the statutory restrictions on jurisdictional strike activity
are consistent with the federal policy enacted in 1947 defining
as an unfair labor practice activity by a union which seeks
to substitute itself as the collective bargaining agent in the
place of one duly selected by the employees. There is here
therefore no conflict with federal policy such as was considered fatal in Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board (Feb. 1951), 340 U.S. 383 [71 S.Ot. 359, 95 L.
Ed. 364], in connection with a statute outlawing all strike
activity on the part of public utility employees and substituting arbitration in the settlement of disputes. It was
there pointed out that the activity forbidden by the Wisconsin
law was one protected under the federal law.
[3] If the union activity here involved is not protected
under the federal act it is not immunized from state action.
'fhe union concerted activity was not protected under the
federal act if another union was certified by the national
board as the collective bargaining representative of the
plaintiff's employees. [4] .And in the absence of such
certification there is no immunity under the state law if
the employees' Local constitutes a collective bargaining representative within the meaning of the jurisdictional strike
provisions. (cf. Park & Tilford I. Corp. v. International etc.
of 'l'earnsters (Jan., 1946), 27 Oa1.2d 599, 603, 604 [165 P.2d
891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].) [ 5] Since the certification of a
union other than the defendant is not shown, a case of condemnation of the union activity under the federal act is not
presented. And as it does not appear that the National Board
has seen fit to act finally in either the representation or the
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unfair charges proceedings there is involved a possible area of
activity which is neither protected nor condemned under the
federal act, and pursuant to the foregoing decisions is subject
to state action under the anti-jurisdictional strike provisions
of the Labor Code.
1'hus, there is here an area open to the state for the
exercise of its police power. [6] The state policy of outlawing jurisdictional coercive activity in the maintenance of
peaceful industrial relations justifies the injunctive as well as
legal relief. [7] The provisions of section 303 (b) of the
amended federal act confining the action which may be brought
in the state courts to that for recovery of damages to business
or property are concerned with state jurisdiction in matters
covered by that act. 'l'hey do not preclude local injunctive
relief in an area open to state control.
[8] In view of the many decisions recognizing the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in the furtherance of unlawful objectives (Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., supra, 336 U.S. 490, 502-503, citing Bakery &; P.
Drivers & H., I. B. T.v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777 [62 S.Ct.
816, 86 L.Ed. 1178] ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,
464 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985] ; International Brotherhood
C. W. & H. Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 [70 S.Ct. 773, 94
L.Ed. 995, 13 A.L.R.2d 631]; Bu1:lding Service Emp. Intl.
Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed.
1 045] citing numerous cases; Internat1'onal Etc. Electrical
Workers v. National Labor Relations Board (June, 1951), 341
U.S. 694, 705 [71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299]; see, also, James
v. Man:nship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 729-730 [155 P.2d 329, 160
A.L.R. 900] and cases cited; Rubin v. American Sportsmen
Television Eq. Soc., I_;, A. No. 21803, post, p. 412 [254 P.2d
510] ), it may not successfully be contended that the defendant unions have the right to publicize the present controversy by means of placards and picketing if the objective is
shown to be in violation of the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act.
As said in the Hughes case at page 464, the "Constitution does
not demand that the element of communication in picketing
prevail over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations" ; and in the Hanke case at page 4 74, that "while picketing has an ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically
be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of
speech . . . . The effort in the cases has been to strike a balance
between the constitutional protection of the element of com-
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munication in picketing and 'the power of the State to set the
limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' ''
In Gerry of Calif01·nia v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.2d
119, there was an attempt by the petitioner's employees to
form their own organization for collective bargaining purposes
and an unsuccessful attempt to obtain certification under the
federal act. The events took place in November, 1947, after
the effective dates of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 (August), and of the state Jurisdictional Strike Act
(September, 1947). In that case apparently neither counsel nor court considered that the effort to form a local
nnaffiliated organization of the nonunion employees constituted a labor organization within the meaning of section 1117
of the Labor Code. Consequently the petitioner's employees
were treated as unorganized for the purpose of the decision in
that case.
The controversy here presents for the first time the question
whether a somewhat similar attempt effects a labor organization within the meaning of the statute. [9] At this point
it may not be seriously questioned that such a local unit,
if qua.lified and undominated by the employer, may constitute
a labor organization for collective bargaining purposes. That
it may is clearly indicated by the language of the statute. That
effect was also impliedly determined by the order of the
National Board in the representation proceeding and in the
dismissal of the charges based on alleged employer domination.
[10] But here the factual elements which would support
the granting of an injunction cannot be finally resolved until
a trial on the merits. In the meantime the trial court was
justified in maintaining the status quo until it should
decide the questions of the lawfulness of the union activity and
the propriety of issuing a permanent injunction. The requirements of qualification and voluntary character of the
Pmployees' organization are preliminarily met by the prima
facie showing in the complaint and the affidavits, and thereby
the trial court's jurisdiction to order the temporary relief is
established. On the application for the preliminary order
thP court also could, and undoubtedly did, weigh the probable
injury which would ensue to the plaintiff by denying the
temporary relief as against the absence of probable injury
which would accrue to the defendants by granting it. The
record does not indicate that the court abused its discretionary power in making these determinations adversely to the
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defendants and in granting the injunctive order pending a
trial on the merits.
The order is affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
GARTER, J.-I dissent.
'l'he majority opin-ion concedes that the activities of defendants unions and Local 1 and its effect on plaintiff employer are within the jurisdict?:on of the National Labor Relations Board and the terms of the Labor JJianagement Relations Act of 1:HL'7 (29 U.S.C.A., § 141 et seq.) and obviously
that is true. It goes on to hold, however, that such activities are also within the purview of our statute known as the
,Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, § 1115 et seq.) It
then concludes that the state act and state courts in enforcing it can operate concurr·ently on those activities. It attempts to distinguish Gerry of California v. Superior Court,
32 Cal.2d 119 [194 P.2d 689} and In 1"e DeSilva, 33 Cal.2d
76 [199 P.2d 6], on the ground that in those cases there was
no state statute or policy which regulated the activity. That,
however, is immaterial for those cases further state that where
the activity comes within the federal act, exclus-ive jurisdiction is conferred on the board under that act. That exclusive
jurisdiction does not disappear merely because the state passes
a statute on the same subject.
'l'he fundamental premise of the majority opinion, that
activities in connection with labor disputes although within
the jurisdiction of the federal law and national board, may
also be regulated and controlled by state statutes and enforced
by state courts, is clearly erroneous as I will endeavor to
demonstrate hereinafter. First, reference should be made to
the most recent case called to my attention, of Capital Service,
Inc. v. N at·ional Labor Relations Board/ where the premise
of the majority opinion is squarely repudiated. There the
federal district court had granted, at the request of the
National Labor Helations Board, an injunction against an
employer enjoining it from enforcing· an injunction it had
obtained in a California superior court enjoining concerted activities (a boycott and picketing) by a union. The
federal court held that the activities violated the federal law
and hence the California co1trt had no j1frisdiction to enjoin
*A rehearing was granted.
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the activities and the district court was correct in so holding.
The court stated :
''The question then arises whether, since both these acts
of picketing are in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
state courts are excluded from attempting to enjoin such
acts where prohibited by the State or federal law?
"We think that the control by the federal tribunals is
exclusive. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) of the original Act provided: 'The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158) affecting commerce. This power
shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise.' (Emphasis supplied.)
''As amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, these two sentences
remain save that the words 'shall be exclusive and' are
stricken, and the states given power of enforcement by agreement with the board in certain cases by adding the following
proviso after the word 'otherwise' : 'Provided, That the Board
is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or
Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases
in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor
disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State
or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such
cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding
provision of this subchapter or has received a construction
inconsistent therewith.'
"We construe this amendment as giving to a state a
right of enforcement only by an agreement reached by it
with the board. Here there was no such agreement.''
In the instant case it appears from the complaint that
plaintiff is doing business under the fictitious name of Comwel
Company in Lynwood, California. His business consists
of manufacture, distribution and installation of steel machinery and equipment, chiefly for service stations. Defendants are various local labor unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and members and officers of those
unions. Plaintiff employs about 50 people.
An organization called Workers Association of Manufacturers and Builders ·of Auto Service Union Local No. 1 (hereafter called Local 1), not financed or controlled by plaintiff,
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organized early in September, 1949, filed on September 16,
1949, a petition with the National Labor Relations Board,
claiming the right to represent plaintiff's employees in collective bargaining, in whieh plaintiff was a party, and one
of defendant unions intervened. On February 24, 1950,
the board ordered an election to determine whether the
union or Local 1 should be the bargaining representative. It
also determined that plaintiff was engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce. At the election a majority voted
in favor of Local 1.
On September 22, 1949, plaintiff filed with the board a
charge, later amended, against some of defendant unions,
claiming the union was engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting interstate commerce under and in violation of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A., § 158
[b] [4] [A] and [B]) in that the unions were inducing other
employees of other employers to refuse to use and handle
plaintiff's products, with the object of forcing other employers
to bargain with a union not certified as a representative, by
picketing and otherwise. Plaintiff thus admitted that interstate commerce was affected. On December 28, 1949, the
regional director of the board refused to issue a complaint
in the matter for ''lack of sufficient evidence of violations''
of the act. No appeal was taken from such refusal.
On October 28, 1949, one of defendant unions filed a charge
with the board alleging unfair labor practices affecting interstate commerce in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A., § 158 [a] [1] and [2]) in that Local
1 was formed by plaintiff to influence his employees in an
election by them to determine their bargaining representative.
On December 13, 1949, the regional director of the board
refused to issue a complaint for lack of evidence. On appeal
to the general counsel, the refusal was affirmed.
The charge in the complaint and affidavits is that defendants demanded that plaintiff accept them as the exclusive
bargaining representative for his employees and to that end
defendants have picketed plaintiff's place of business and
his customer's places of business where plaintiff was installing
his equipment and otherwise sought to induce other employers and employees to refuse to deal with plaintiff or handle
his products, which practices succeeded in injuring plaintiff's
business. According to plaintiff, he was approached during
1949, before Local1 was formed, by defendants who demanded
the right to be the exclusive bargainers for his employees
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and to execute a contract to that end. He refused because
his employees did not want to join the union. Threats of
picketing and of preventing suppliers and subcontractors
from working on the jobs were made by defendants. Defendants engaged in concerted action against plaintiff con:-;isting of picketing and advising plaintiff's customers not
to deal with him, and coercing the contractors by threatening to call off the men on their jobs if they continued to
deal with plaintiff. The activity was successful, causing considerable damage to plaintiff's business. The injunction restrained the foregoing activities.
Plaintiff seeks to justify the injunction on the basis of the
,Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, § 1115 et seq.) considered in Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Dn:vers Union,
ante, p. 368 [254 P.2d 544]. Defendants claim the act
is unconstitutional and that it does not apply here because
their concerted activities did not arise out of a dispute between them and Local1 (see Lab. Code, § 1118) but had been
in existence prior to Local 1 's formation. Plaintiff also relies
upon section 923 of the Labor Code.
Beyond doubt the case is controlled exclusively by the National Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and is
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,
and any state policy, legislative or judicial, must give way.
The act sets up a comprehensive system dealing with represrntation in collective bargaining and unfair labor practices
on the part of both management and labor organizations. Its
cleelared policy is that industrial strife which interferes with
the flow of interstate commerce can be avoided or minimized
if rmployers, employees and labor organizations each recognize
the other's legitimate rights, and the purpose of the act is to
preserve the legitimate rights of employers and employees
and to provide for orderly and peaceful procedures to achieve
tl1e:"r goals. (29 U.S.C.A. § 141.) Rights are assured to employres "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organi7.ations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mntual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of snch activities except to the ext<:>nt
that snch right may be affected by an agreement requiring
Jllrmhership in a labor organization as a condition of employmrnt as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title." (Jd.,
§ 157.) Certain activities on the part of the employer are de-
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(;Jared unfair labor practices, such as "to interfere with, rPsi rain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sectiou 157 of this title; . . . by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in
this sub-chapter, or in any other statute of the United States,
t>hall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in section 158(a) of this title as an
unfair labor practiee) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of
such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor
org·anization i" the representative of the employees as provided in section 1:'59 (a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when mad(>;
and ( ii) if, following the most recent election held as provided
in section 159 (e) of this title the Board shall have certified
that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in
such election have voted to authorize such labor organization
to make such an ag-reement: Provided further, 'l'hat no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization (a) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was
not available to the employee on the same terms and eon(litions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly req aired as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership . . . . '' (Id., § 158 [a] [1] and [3]) Similarly it
is unfair practice for a labor organization to " ( 1) restrain or
coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of
his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances; (2) to cause or attempt to
eause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership
in snch organization has been denied or terminated on some
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ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership; . . . ( 4) to engage in,
or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof
is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed
person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title;
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain
with a particular labor organization as the representati.ve of
his employees if another labor organization has been certified
as .the representative of such employees under the provisions
of section 159 of this title; . . . (c) The expressing of any
views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.''
(Id., § 158 [b] [1] [2] [4] and [c].) The board has jurisdiction to determine the proper bargaining representative on
petition of employees, labor organization, or employer and for
elections to that end. (Id., § 159.) Also, it is given power to
prevent engaging in unfair labor practices and to invoke
federal court jurisdiction to that end. (Id., § 160.) That
jurisdiction excludes injunctive relief by the state courts.
(Gerry of Cal1:{ornia v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119 [194
P.2d 689] ; In re DeSilva, 33 Cal.2d 76 [199 P.2d 6].)
'fhe trend of the decisions of the courts is that state regulation is not applicable either on the theory of occupation of
the field of regulating strikes, picketing and boycotts by the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, or that such concerted action falls within the protection of section 157 of the
law quoted supra; that minority picketing for recognition
is not subject to state regulation. One phase of the problem
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was considered by this court in Gerry of California v. Superior
Court, supra, 32 Cal.2d 119, and In re DeSilva, supra, 33 Cal.
2d 76. In both of those cases picketing of an employer was
done by a union to organize the employer's employees. An
injunction was sought on the ground that the conduct consisted of an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, no state law being violated. It was
decided in the Gerry case that there was an unfair labor practice and in the DeSilva case that was ''assumed.'' We
held that an injunction could not stand because the exclusive
jurisdiction to prevent a violation of the act rested with
the National Labor Relations Board. While we were primarily concerned with whether the state courts had jurisdiction to enforce a violation of the national act rather than
whether a state could enforce its own labor regulation where
interstate commerce was affected, we reviewed the whole
field as to the place occupied by the federal law and that
left to the states. We stated in the DeSilva case, summarizing
the holding of the Gerry case (p. 78): "This court there [in the
Gerry case] held that the declared intent and purpose of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, was to vest exclusive
jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board over unfair
labor practices affecting interstate commerce and to vest in the
courts generally jurisdiction only of actions for damages
arising out of the commission of such practices, and that the
act deprived the superior courts of original equitable jurisdiction in such cases." (Emphasis added.) In the Gerry case
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Amalgamated U. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261
[ 60 S. Ct. 561, 84 L.Ed. 738] was summarized: "The Supreme
Court pointed out that the course of procedure was definite
and restricted; that the board and the board alone could determine whether an employer had engaged in an unfair labor
practice; that the board was chosen as the instrument or
agency, exclusive of any private person or group, to assure
protection from the described unfair conduct in order to
remove obstnwtions to interstate commerce, and that the
board alone was authorized to take proceedings to enforce
its order. The sole authority of the board to secure prevention
of unfair labor practices affecting commerce was thus recognized. That section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act
committed to the boarcl the exclusive power to decide whether
unfair labor practices by the employer had been engaged in
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and to determine the action that shotlld be taken to remove
or avoid the eonseqttenees thereof was again stated . . . . The
most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court to come
to our attention is in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relat?:ons Board, supra ( [330 U.S. 767, 91 L.Ed. 1234]
67 S.Ct. 1026, reversing 295 N.Y. 601 and 607 [64 N.E.2d
3:JO]), wherein it was held that state and federal action coven:ng the subject matter of the National Labor Relations Act
could not coexist." (Emphasis added.) (Gen·y of Caliform:a
v. Su.pe1·ior Gaud, 32 Cal.2d 119, 124 [194 P.2d 689].) That
discussion means that in cases such as this it rests with the
board to determine, at least at this stage of the proceeding,
whether an unfair labor practice has been committed and to
take such action as it deems advisable. This court cannot,
therefore, be concerned with the question of whether in fact
there have been unfair labor practices committed.
Since the DeSilva case the Supreme Court of the United
States has continued in the same direction. It held in La
C1·osse Tel. Cm·p. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18 [69 S.Ct. 379. 93 L.Ed. 463], that the federal act controlled questions relating to representation of employees. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 301 [69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691], seemed to
take a step backward, but in Plankinton Packing Co. v. W?:sconsin Emp. Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953 [70 S.Ct. 491,
94 L.Ed. 588], the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holding that Wisconsin's labor relations law as to
unfair labor practices controlled, was reversed without opinion. In International Union of U. A., A. & A. & I. W. v.
O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 [70 S.Ct. 781, 94 I..J.Ed. 978], a Michigan strike control law which required a prior notice and
a majority vote before a strike, was held inapplicable because of the federal act, in that it attempted to limit a federal
right of employees to engage in concerted activities and to
strike, and that the federal act regulated such rights. The
court concluded the opinion by referring to certain areas in
which state action was proper, ineluding a discussion of the
cases, such as Internat,ional Union, U. A. W. v. Wisconsin
Emp. Relations Boanl, 336 U.S. 245 [69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed.
651], heavily relied upon by plaintiff and showing that the
J ul'isdictional Strike I_jaw is not in the class of activity reserved for state action. The court said: "International Union,
U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 [69
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S.Ct. :i16. f):l IJ_gd_ fiiill (Hl49). upon which Michigan prinrdies, was not i'Oll('Pnwd with a traditional, peaceful
strike for higher wag·c:;;. The employees' eomlnet there was 'a
new teeJmique for bringing pressure upon the employer,' a
'recurrent or interlllittent unannounced stoppage of work to
\Yill nm:tated end:,;.'
l (1. at 249, 264. That activity we regarded as 'coercive,' similar to the sit-down strike held to
fall outside the protection of the federal act in National Labor
Relations Board v. Fansteel 111 etallu.rgical Corp. ( 1939), 306
U.S. 240 [59 S.Ct. 490, 83 hEel. 627, 123 A.L.R. 599] (1939),
and to the labor violence held to be subject to state police
control in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations
Board, 315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154] (1942).
In the ·wisconsin Auto. \Vorkers case, we concluded that the
union tactic was 'neither forbidden by federal statute nor
was it legalized and approved thereby.' 336 U.S. at 265.
'There is no existing or possible conflict or overlapping between the authority of the Federal and State Boards, because the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate,
approve or forbid the union conduct in question. This conduct is g'overnable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.'
I d. at 254. Clear'ly, 1ue reaffirmed the principle that if 'Congress has protected the nnion cond~tct which the State has
forbidden . . . the state legislation must yield.' I d. at 252."
(Emphasis added.) (Internat?:onal Union of U. A., A. & I. W.
v. O'Brien, supra, 339 U.S. 454, 459.) The court summarized
the area still open to state action in Allen-Bradley Local No.
1111 v. Wisconsin Ernp. Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 [62
S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154], stating that: "[T]he state's exercise of its police power (e.g., the prevention of mass picketing
of the employer's factory, threatening personal injury or property damage to employees desiring to work, obstructing entrance to and egress from the employer's factory, obstructing the streets and public roads, picketing the homes of employees, and other breaches of the peace in connection with
labor disputes) was not intended to be excluded by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, and that the
exercise of that power by the state could stand consistently
with the operation of the federal act." (Gerry of California
v. Superior Court, s1rpra, 32 Cal.2d 119, 125.) The conduct
here involved does not fall in that category. I believe it is
clear that the circumstances existing here present either a
case of an unfair labor practice, or that the conduct is protected by the national act (29 U.S.C.A. § 157), which ques(~ipally
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tions are, in this state at least, determinable by the National
Board.
The court had no jurisdiction, therefore, to grant the injunction and I would reverse the order.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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MIKE HIRSCH ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondent, v.
AMERICAN SPORTSMEN TELEVISION. EQUITY
SOCIETY et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Findings and Conclusions.-Where the question of de-

fendant television society's claimed organizational and picketing rights concerns wrestlers whose contests are televised,
but the evidence is neither clear nor conclusive that such
wrestlers are employees of plaintiff promoters and not independent contractors, and the factual problem involved because of exclusion of independent contractors from the National Labor Relations Act is not necessarily finally resolved
by the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the trial court
is justified, pending a hearing on the merits, in coming to
the tentative conclusion that the relationship falls into an
"entrepreneurial enterprise," rather than into employment subject to the protections of the federal act.
[2] Id.-Jurisdiction.-If the jurisdictional issue involved in defendant society's televising of wrestling contests is resolved
by a determination that wrestlers are independent contractors
and thus excluded from the National Labor Relations Act,
judicial investigation of the bona fides of defendant as a
labor organization can take place only in the state forum.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Labor, § 29; [2, 3] Labor, § 24;
[4] Labor, § 18; [5, 6] Labor, § 25.

